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U.S. Department of State 93/05/11 Testimony to SFRC on START II Treaty Approval Urged Office of the Spokesman Statement by Secretary Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC May 11, 1993 Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the START II Treaty. As you both have said, few tasks of the Senate are as important as your constitutional duty to give advice and consent to the ratification of treaties, especially this treaty. Today, as the committee and the Senate begin their consideration of the START II Treaty, we have entered a new era of US-Russian relations. This historic arms control achievement, if ratified, would have the paradoxical but positive effect of moving the arms control process away from the center of the stage in our relations. Now, the two former Cold War adversaries are forging a new partnership, based upon common interests and marked by increasing political and economic cooperation. This new relationship is what made the START II Treaty possible. Prompt ratification of the START II Treaty will, in turn, strengthen and deepen both our national security and US-Russian relations. First and foremost, START II is in the national security interest of the United States. By eliminating the most destabilizing weapons facing the United States, it will reduce tensions and contribute significantly to US security. It will solidify the broader cooperative relationship that the United States and Russia are now building. It will bolster the partnership between the United States and Russia by encouraging Russia to strengthen democratic institutions and free markets rather than focusing on maintaining large and unnecessary nuclear arsenals. START II is also in Russia's interest. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that all of our interests and Russia's will converge in all cases. We will, of course, on occasion disagree, just as we sometimes disagree with our other friends. But with respect to the ratification of START II, United States and Russian interests converged to a striking extent. Evolving Relations Between the United States and Russia While the era of confrontation has ended, the central importance of Russia to US foreign policy continues. No development outside our borders will do more to help ensure a peaceful and prosperous world than for Russia to continue the process of democratization and economic reform. All of us who support Russian democracy and reform were heartened by the outcome of last month's referendum in Russia. The substantial turnout was also compelling evidence that Russian democracy is taking hold and that the Russian people are prepared to continue the difficult task of reform. As President Clinton reaffirmed to President Yeltsin in Vancouver, the United States stands ready to do its part to help reform and democracy succeed. That kind of support is fundamentally in America's interest. No relationship is more important to the long-term security of the United States than our strategic relationship with Russia. We have seen the development of a cooperative and constructive relationship with Russia in many areas. Last week, I was in Moscow for consultations on the crisis in Bosnia. During these discussions, Russia pledged that it would participate in the implementation of a negotiated settlement in Bosnia if an agreement can be reached. The prospect of US and Russian forces working together as peace-keepers demonstrates how far this relationship has come. Ultimately, the success of democracy in Russia and the transformation to a market economy are the best guarantees of international strategic stability. The Congress has done much to encourage Russia's movement to a free market democracy governed by the rule of law. I urge you to continue that support as the Russian people and their government face even greater challenges in the months ahead. START II and the US National Interest While arms control is only one element of our new relationship with Russia, it remains a very important one. START II, along with the initial START Treaty, remains in our interest as we move into the post- Cold War era. It offers enhanced stability, it fosters transparency and openness, and it eliminates the first-strike capabilities and strategies of a bygone era. Its formal, binding structure undergirds the political elements of our relationship. And the cooperative work necessary to implement the sweeping reductions will lead to collaboration on other security issues. As we consider this treaty, we must be mindful of our former adversary's capability, in case, by some tragic miscarriage of history, their intentions should change. This treaty meets that important test. Should the era of confrontation return, the provisions of START II will significantly increase stability and, thus, reduce the risk of war. START II mandates reductions in the strategic forces of the two sides that would have been unthinkable even 2 years ago. By January 1 of the year 2003, strategic forces will be cut to one-third of their current levels. Indeed, if we and the Russians are able to agree on a program of US assistance in dismantling the strategic offensive arms, these vast reductions could come even earlier--by the end of the year 2000--which would be an encouraging milestone for the new millennium. Mr. Chairman and members, more important than the reductions themselves is the elimination of the MIRVed ICBMs, especially the heavy ICBMs, the most dangerous and destabilizing legacy of the era of nuclear confrontation. Under START II, all of the Russian SS-18 heavy missiles will be destroyed and all of their silos will be destroyed or converted. No single act better symbolizes the end of the superpower nuclear arms race. While economic pressures may well have required Russia to reduce its strategic offensive weapons in a drastic way, it is the START II Treaty that will ensure that Russia actually reduces and does so in a stabilizing way. And it is the START II Treaty that will remove the issue of strategic force size from the Russian political debate. As the Chairman has said, START II completes the work of the first START Treaty. Where the first START Treaty discouraged MIRVed ICBMs, START II bans them. Where the first START Treaty eliminated half the heavy ICBM launchers, START II eliminates all of them--and their missiles as well. At the same time, START II preserves the US force structure needed for deterrence, and it allows us to adapt our bomber force to our future needs. The benefits of START II extend well beyond the United States and Russia. The deep reductions in US and Russian forces well below START I levels enhance the security of the other START I parties--Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. START II also supports our efforts to gain universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. When coupled with START I, the START II Treaty will lead to a world in which nuclear weapons have been eliminated from all of the states of the former Soviet Union except Russia. It will also lead to a world in which the strategic forces of Russia are dramatically reduced and restructured. START II will complement the political integration of Russia into the family of nations by codifying a strategic relationship appropriate for an era of cooperation, not confrontation. START II and Russian Interests Enduring treaties must be in the interest of both parties. START II is such a treaty. I have already mentioned the advantages of the treaty for the United States, but I've also noted START II is in Russia's interest as well. Let me just mention some of the ways in which START II will serve our mutual interests. START II will bring economic benefits to Russia. It will allow Russia to avoid the future burden of large strategic arsenals and the need to invest significant resources to maintain modern strategic forces at or near current levels. In this way, START II will facilitate Russia's shift from a military-dominated economy to a free market economy dedicated to meeting the needs of the Russian people--a free market economy that also serves as a potential US market. As a reflection of the new cooperative relationship between our two nations, START II also represents a political symbol of great importance. Finally, the START II Treaty will move both Russia and the United States toward more stabilizing force structures. One of the main accomplishments is the elimination of the MIRVed ICBMs, traditionally regarded as a major threat to strategic stability. The less-threatening forces that will result from the treaty will increase stability and improve Russia's political relationships with its neighbors as well. Status of Ratification in the Former Soviet UnionMr. Chairman, in inviting me to appear today, you specifically asked that I discuss the remaining obstacles to ratification of the START I Treaty by Ukraine and the adherence to the NPT Treaty by Kazakhstan and Ukraine. These developments are crucial, since START II cannot enter into force until START I has been brought into force first. The legislatures of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have already consented to START I ratification. In approving START I, the Russian parliament imposed a condition that Russia would not exchange instruments of ratification until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine each accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear- weapon states parties. Thus far, only Belarus, as you mentioned, has approved both treaties. Kazakhstan has ratified START I, and we expect the Kazakhstani legislature to authorize accession to the NPT Treaty in the near future. The Ukrainian parliament has begun hearings on the START I Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although some Ukrainians are urging delay in joining the NPT, the Government of Ukraine remains committed both to START I and to a non-nuclear Ukraine. We have taken a number of steps to meet the concerns Ukraine has expressed and are looking forward to having both Ukraine and Kazakhstan complete action on START and the NPT soon. Mr. Chairman, just before I came up here this morning, I talked on the telephone to Strobe Talbott, who is in Moscow today, having returned from Ukraine. He reports that his conversations in the Ukraine were encouraging. He was received by the President of the country, who reaffirmed the intention of the leadership of that country to proceed with the ratification of START I and accession to the NPT. Mr. Talbott indicated that the tone of the discussions, he thought, was improved, although the parliament there continues to have some difficulties. I was encouraged to find that President Kravchuk will continue to press for ratification of START I and accession to the NPT Treaty. I know that many Members of Congress--of this committee, in particular-- are concerned over the delay. I share these concerns, but I'd like to put that delay in context for just a moment. I think that all Americans would rather see a free debate than the rubber-stamped approval of the Soviet-style legislature. There is a time, however, we all feel, for debate and discussion, and a time for action. I hope that the time for action is soon going to arrive in Ukraine for the approval of these two treaties. Then our two governments can work together on the broader agenda for cooperation and partnership that we will wish to establish with Ukraine, a major European nation. That's essentially the message that Mr. Talbott brought to the Ukrainians, that we can get over this hurdle of ratification and accession which was promised in the Lisbon protocols. The relationships between our two countries can greatly improve. In any event, I believe the delay on START I is no reason for us to defer action on START II. START II, after all, reduces the threat to all of Russia's neighbors by reducing Russian nuclear forces. Thus, prompt Senate action to approve START II will encourage rapid action on the part of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Summary As I conclude here, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that regardless of the outcome of the struggle for democracy and free markets in Russia, START II dramatically improves the strategic stability by eliminating the final vestiges of the old Soviet first-strike strategic forces. It is thus in our interest and, indeed, in the interest of the entire world that this treaty be promptly ratified. START II, as you indicated in your comments, Mr. Chairman, is an unusual treaty, negotiated by one Administration to be ratified and implemented by its successor Administration of another party. As this committee is aware, President Clinton warmly endorsed the negotiation of this treaty and supported its basic concepts before taking office. In the months since January, we have reviewed the details of the START II Treaty carefully. That review has convinced us that the treaty is sound and should be approved without change. Therefore, on behalf of the President, I urge the Senate to give prompt approval to this important treaty. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I'll be followed by many other witnesses on behalf of the Administration--the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, experts who negotiated the treaty--but I'll be very glad to try to respond to any questions that you and the other Senators have. (###)