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U.S. Department of State 93/05/18 Testimony on Foreign Assistance Priorities After the Cold War Office of the Spokesman Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Washington, DC May 18, 1993 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Mr. Gilman, and the committee. Together, we face the challenge of crafting a foreign policy for a new era of unprecedented change, hope, and opportunity. The Clinton Administration approaches this task with the conviction that strong public support for foreign policy at home is essential to American effectiveness abroad. Today, domestic issues and foreign issues are inseparable. The American public expects our foreign policy investments to pay dividends in economic growth and the advancement of democratic ideals. As our Administration goes forward, we expect to deliver on those expectations. As I mentioned to the full committee in January, when we met informally, President Clinton has identified three overarching goals for our foreign policy: First, elevating national and global economic growth as a primary foreign policy goal; Second, updating our forces and security arrangements to meet new threats; and Third, organizing our foreign policy to promote democracy, human rights, and free markets abroad. Russian Aid All three of these overarching policy goals would be greatly advanced by the success of Russian democracy and economic reform. We must take strong action to cooperate with Russia. The results of the referendum were a significant victory for democracy and economic reform. But the worst mistake we could make would be to assume that all of our work had been done. It's only begun. As President Clinton has said, helping ensure the success of Russian democracy is the supreme security challenge of our era and is in our deep self-interest. An investment today in Russia's democratic future is an essential investment in America's future. By making this investment, we can help turn what was our most dangerous adversary into an enduring partner. This, I believe, is a critical mission. International Affairs Budget Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you've already seen the details of the President's April 8 budget request, so I'd only like to stress one very important point that often gets lost in the details with regard to the Budget Function 150 account. Historically, international affairs spending has represented just over 1% of our total federal expenditures, a modest investment, indeed, in furtherance of our nation's vital international objectives. The FY 1994 budget marks a first step in redirecting our foreign policy, refocusing our foreign affairs funds, and reforming our foreign policy structures to help meet the three overarching goals that President Clinton has set forth for the post-Cold War era--supporting democracy, promoting growth, and strengthening security. The FY 1994 budget is, by necessity, a transitional budget. Changes in some of the details of our budget request are possible and probably even likely. Our post-Cold War world is itself undergoing a profound transition. The new challenges and opportunities we face in the world require fundamental changes in the direction of our foreign policy as well as a fundamental restructuring of our foreign policy institutions. I believe we've made a good, strong start, but much remains to be done. We intend to work very closely and cooperatively with this committee during your deliberations on our funding request. Peace-keeping Mr. Chairman, I know this committee has very important responsibilities with respect to funding UN activities. The FY 1994 international affairs budget requests nearly $700 million in contributions to the United Nations and other international peace-keeping operations. We've also requested $300 million in FY 1993 supplemental funds to meet unanticipated needs for international peace-keeping. Millions spent now on multilateral preventative diplomacy--emergency refugee support and peace-keeping--may save hundreds of millions in defense and international relief later. At a time when we're calling on the United Nations to do much more, we cannot support it less. The end of the Cold War has unleashed long-suppressed conflicts in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere. It has also opened up new possibilities for international cooperation, and I believe we must seize them. Development, Economic, and Security Assistance I know that Brian Atwood, our new USAID Administrator, appeared before you only last week and set forth our approach to redefining the role of U.S. assistance. I won't repeat what he said, but I would like to reinforce some of the main points he made. During the Cold War, geopolitical and security concerns dominated our economic assistance program. In the post-Cold War era, however, we must now target our assistance to address today's priorities: global growth and domestic job creation; transnational challenges such as disease, environmental degradation, global population growth, and migration; and promoting sustainable economies and stable democracies. In the past decade, we mobilized our assistance against communism. Now, we can and must mobilize ourselves for democracy, for free markets, and for a secure international environment in which they can flourish. Today, our watchwords must be empowerment, partnership, and effectiveness. During the Cold War, the imperative of assisting national governments resulted in the rise of large, highly centralized aid bureaucracies focusing on government-to-government relations. Now we can build economic, civic, and cultural partnerships between peoples. We must support democratic values through individual empowerment. Foreign assistance will serve as our venture capital in mobilizing America's major asset--our robust civil society--in support of political and economic freedom worldwide. Forging broad and non-traditional partnerships with our allies and with international financial institutions will help us do more with less, a key challenge in an era of vast possibility and tight budgets. Our focus on individual empowerment and partnerships will also enhance our effectiveness. Our foreign assistance programs will be result- oriented, not expenditure-oriented. National entitlements will be phased out, and our institutions will be made flexible enough to ensure that assistance can go where we find cooperation and reform are manifest. Where scarce development resources cannot be used effectively, our assistance programs should be reduced or redirected. To be effective--to get results--the Agency for International Development itself must be reorganized. We seek greater efficiency and smaller overseas missions. At the same time, we will work to strengthen USAID's central policy direction. We'll foster teamwork and accountability throughout the Agency, and we'll ensure better agency coordination. Dr. Wharton and his Function 150 Task Force will forward their report on USAID to me shortly. Before commenting, I want to review it in depth. I hope that consultations with this committee and other key committees will begin soon so we can discuss the report and I can get your reactions to it. Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge publicly the role of this committee- -and its Chairman and ranking minority member--in the reform of our foreign assistance programs and institutions. As Mr. Gilman said, the recommendations of your 1989 task force will be largely adopted by the Administration. I look forward to continuing to rely on your leadership and support in the coming months. I want to highlight four budget proposals that reflect some of our foreign aid priorities. First, we are requesting development funding for Africa at $800 million. In addition, we will continue to provide over half a billion dollars in humanitarian and other assistance to Africa; Second, we're requesting a $100-million increase in population programs, including a $50-million contribution to the United Nations Family Planning Agency; Third, we have requested enhanced funding to address global environmental concerns; and Fourth, we will also undertake democracy-building programs around the world. Our development assistance should be judged not on the basis of funds obligated but on the basis of results achieved, and the same applies to security assistance. Security assistance can help strengthen friends and allies so they can play a larger role in promoting regional stability, defending themselves against aggression, and participating in peace-keeping activities. The Clinton Administration does not view security assistance in isolation but in terms of how it can serve the mutually reinforcing and overarching goals of our foreign policy. Nonproliferation and disarmament are among the greatest national security challenges facing us today. The proposed FY 1994 budget reflects an integrated, government-wide approach to nonproliferation and arms control. We're requesting funds for the establishment of a new $50-million Non-Proliferation Fund. Departmental resources will also be devoted to addressing other global problems, such as AIDS, international crime, terrorism, and narcotics production and trafficking. Humanitarian Assistance Alleviating human suffering remains a high priority in our FY 1994 budget. During FY 1993, we provided worldwide relief to refugees and victims of poverty and of natural disasters and crises such as war, famine, and drought. Significant amounts of aid are being directed to the vast human tragedies in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The Clinton Administration is committed to continuing the funding levels Congress provided for these activities in FY 1993, and we're also proposing a $20-million increase in refugee assistance in 1994. To conclude the broad topic of assistance, Mr. Chairman, if we succeed with our plans for redirecting and revitalizing our assistance efforts, Americans will benefit and the world will benefit. State Department Reform Now, a few words about State Department reform. Given the budget constraints, flexibility and wise management of funds for all our programs and institutions become ever more important. In this regard, I'd particularly like to commend Representative Berman and Representative Snowe for their subcommittee's efforts to provide me with increased flexibility and decreased micromanagement. I know you're marking up the State Department bill next week, and I appreciate very much your help as the Department tries to accomplish more with fewer budgetary resources. Our broad-based reform of the State Department's organization and operations is designed to achieve quicker, more open, more cost- effective policy-making and performance. We must achieve clearer financial accountability. We must invest in better training for our personnel, both Foreign and Civil Service. And we must ensure that the face of the Department, which is shown to the world, is a diverse face. The committee's cooperation and support remains vital to the success of our overall reform efforts. I want you to know, Mr. Chairman and all members of the committee, that our Administration is more open to your views than ever as we face together the challenge of forging a new foreign policy, better channeling our resources, and adapting our institutions to a world that is fundamentally changed. Bosnia And now, Mr. Chairman, before I close, I want to add a few words on the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia, a matter that I know is of deep interest to the committee. The Bosnian Serb so-called referendum this past weekend has overwhelmingly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan. At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs and others in that sad country continue to engage in aggression. As you know, I never gave much weight to the so-called referendum, and I indicated from the moment the Bosnian Serbs called for it that it would in no way advance the cause of peace; and I believe it has not done so. My attitude was similar toward the signature by the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on the Vance-Owen plan in Athens a couple of weeks ago. Subsequent events have made a mockery of that signature. What we have looked at, and looked for, from the beginning were not signatures or words or referenda but rather actions on the ground, demonstrating a serious interest in ending the violence and coming to a peaceful settlement. We have seen no real indication of such actions by the Bosnian Serbs. This is a historically tragic and difficult problem. It involves a struggle among three groups--the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims--all residing in Bosnia and each possessing deep distrust and ancient hatreds of each other. The war that began 2 years ago has evolved into a war of all against all. Indeed, some of the most violent recent battles have taken place in the western half of Bosnia between Croat and Muslim fighters, particularly around the town of Mostar. There are atrocities on all sides in this terrible situation. Obviously, any intervention in such a morass must be carefully considered and carefully weighed with a clear view to what the United States' interests are. In addressing this problem, President Clinton has set forth several principles that guide our consideration of further steps to respond to the violence, to produce a political settlement, and to contain the conflict. The first principle is that we will not act alone in taking actions in the former Yugoslavia. This is a multilateral problem, and it must have a multilateral response. There are a number of countries already involved on the ground, and a number of countries have moral, political, and strategic interests at stake here. Furthermore, at heart this is a European problem. We will do what we can, in concert with our allies and friends, to respond to the violence and contain the conflict; but we will not act unilaterally. Second, the United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to engage in military action. As I've said, we are prepared to commit our military forces to implement a peace settlement entered into consensually and in good faith by the parties, but we will not use our military forces to impose a settlement in the Balkans. The President's position is that the best way to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and, ultimately, contain the conflict is to lift the present arms embargo, coupled with a standby authority for air power in the event that the Bosnian Serbs try to take advantage of the situation while the Bosnian Government is preparing to defend itself. This approach is, in the President's judgment, the right course; but it's an approach that, obviously, can be carried out only with the cooperation of our allies and friends. It will require the repeal of a United Nations Security Council resolution which was supported by the prior Administration and by the governments in Europe. As you know, our allies and friends in Europe are not prepared to follow this course at the present time. However, we're continuing to consult with them on these proposals and other steps. Along these lines, I'll be engaging in a new round of consultations on the problem in the next several days. I'll be meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev from Russia on Thursday and Foreign Minister Juppe of France here in Washington on Monday. Although, Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult situation--a problem I once described as a "problem from hell"--our involvement and our actions have made a difference. American leadership has resulted in concerted pressure that has produced some tangible results. We've become engaged diplomatically, and we were able to get two of the three parties to sign on to the Vance-Owen agreement. We were able to get enforcement of a "no-fly" zone. We've engaged in a large-scale humanitarian effort that has saved thousands of lives. Our pressures have directly resulted in Milosevic's recent shift to pushing for a peace agreement and agreeing to increasingly isolate the Bosnian Serbs, and we have increased the sanctions against Serbia very considerably in the last few days. These actions have been consistent with our interests. In situations like this, Mr. Chairman, we must be tough, but we also must try to be wise. And being wise means acting in ways that are consistent with our national interests. This the President has done and will continue to do. (###)